Materialism vs Dualism

[Marcus Brutus]

Ok guys, time I think for something a little different (the whole god thing is getting a bit stale). What are our views on consciousness and the mind? Is a sensation identical to a brain process which is identical to the firing of neutrons inside our brain. Or is there something within us that is actually doing the sensing? I suppose this leads to questions about the existence of the soul and such... I think if we can come up with a solid theory for materialism it should be accepted before dualism as it would be inately more simple. Thoughts?

[nocturne]

A is a theory
a and b are neural substrates

A is semantically equivalent to its semantic content i.e. the set of every logical consequence of A. In other words P and ~(~P), read as 'it is false that A is false', are alternative methods of expressing the same theory. Therefore, the semantic content of A is infinite, since even the empty set of premises entails infinitely many tautologies.

The brain is finite, and so a cannot represent A, but can only represent a finite subset of the semantic content of A, including at least one member which is semantically equivalent to A (otherwise a would not represent A). However, the semantic content of A which is not represented in a does not cease to be, but persists even when we are not thinking about it. For example, if A is contradictory, then A was always contradictory, even before we discover the contradiction. Therefore, the theory A has semantic content which exists, and yet cannot be reduced to any neural substrate (primarily because the semantic content of a theory is infinite, whereas the brain is finite).

Moreover, if a and b are nonidentical neural substrates, but both of which represent A (perhaps a and b are in different brains, or in different languages, or whatever), then A cannot be identical to either a or b, since both are nonidentical. If we are to say that two neural subtrates are thinking about A, then A is something which is publically accessible, objective, and yet not identical to any particular brain representation (if it were, then it would no longer be publically accessible, and it would be impossible for two people to think about the same theory).

In other words, ideas exist.

[Marcus Brutus]

A is a theory
a and b are neural substrates

A is semantically equivalent to its semantic content i.e. the set of every logical consequence of A. In other words P and ~(~P), read as 'it is false that A is false', are alternative methods of expressing the same theory. Therefore, the semantic content of A is infinite, since even the empty set of premises entails infinitely many tautologies.

The brain is finite, and so a cannot represent A, but can only represent a finite subset of the semantic content of A, including at least one member which is semantically equivalent to A (otherwise a would not represent A). However, the semantic content of A which is not represented in a does not cease to be, but persists even when we are not thinking about it. For example, if A is contradictory, then A was always contradictory, even before we discover the contradiction. Therefore, the theory A has semantic content which exists, and yet cannot be reduced to any neural substrate (primarily because the semantic content of a theory is infinite, whereas the brain is finite).

Moreover, if a and b are nonidentical neural substrates, but both of which represent A (perhaps a and b are in different brains, or in different languages, or whatever), then A cannot be identical to either a or b, since both are nonidentical. If we are to say that two neural subtrates are thinking about A, then A is something which is publically accessible, objective, and yet not identical to any particular brain representation (if it were, then it would no longer be publically accessible, and it would be impossible for two people to think about the same theory).

In other words, ideas exist.

Hmm, i think you are running into confusion here. Think of an equalaterial triangle with corners a, b and c (actually you might need to draw this it may be hard to visualise). Now take a line that runs directly from the corner a to the point in the middle of the line between b and c. Let this point be A. Likewise do the same to get B and C. In the middle of the triangle there is a point where line(a,A) and line(b,B) intersect. There is also a point where line(a,A) and line(c,C) intersect and also where line(b,B) and line(c,C) intersect. These three points of intersection are in fact the same point. In this case the middle point of the triangle is identical with all 3 of these intersects, however these intersects are not identicial to each other; they have different meanings.

Similiarily, your example of A being non-identical with a and b because a is non-identical with b, is not necessarily true - it is not logically necessary. There are different senses of a and b, but they both refer to the same identity, A.

[nocturne]

Similiarily, your example of A being non-identical with a and b because a is non-identical with b, is not necessarily true - it is not logically necessary. There are different senses of a and b, but they both refer to the same identity, A.No, it really is logically necessary*.

1. a = A = b

'=' is transitive, so if '1' is true then,

2. a = b

However, we have already agreed that a and b are not identical i.e. not the same thing, so,

3. a ≠ b

This is a contradiction. In fact, you acknowledge this implicitly by saying that a and b refer to the same identity; namely, the theory A. I agree that a and b reference A, but neither is identical with A, if not simply for the fact that the semantic content of A is infinite whereas a and b are finite. If you imagine the semantic content of A to be a landscape, then you can imagine the brain be "looking" at only a finitely small piece of the landscape at any one time, and we explore this landscape by logical analysis of the theory in question, teasing out interesting implications or, perhaps, contradictions. The very fact that a and b only reference A is precisely my point, they reference the same theory, but are not identical with the theory which they reference, otherwise they would not need to "reference" the theory at all, because they would simply be the theory.

The semantic content of some theory A has all the properties which we would normally associate with something which exists, such as that it persists even when we are not thinking about it i.e. when there is no neural substrate which represents it, and when we discover some interesting implication, or contradiction, we recognise that this implication had always been there, and that we discovered it by exploring the theory. In other words, we understand that a theory does not become contradictory when we discover a contradiction, but was contradictory from its inception and we simply had not noticed; that is, there was no neural substrate shining its flashlight, thinking about, that piece of its semantic content.

Moreover, theories have a public character, just like any other object that would ordinarily be said to exist i.e. their content is intersubjectively verifiable; that is, we can both think about, or explore, the same theory, and semantic content. In other words, theory A, like the empire state building, the eiffel tower, or the pyramids, is publically accessible to anyone who can go and take a look. It is that public character which allows for rational discussion to take place with regard to theories, and for them to be analysed and understood by anyone who take the time and energy to try. If theories were identical to brainstates, then theories would no longer be publically accessible like this, and no two people could talk about the same theory, rendering rational discussion regarding any theory, futile.

* the '=' sign can be ambiguous. I am here using it to denote identity. For example, two vehicles of the same model may be equal to one another in many ways, but they are not identical to each other. In the above example, though a and b may be equal to one another in regard to what they reference, they are not equal in every possible way; that is, each has properties which the other does not, and so they are not identical. In other words, for 'a = A = b', every statement which would be true of a must also be true for A and b (however, since a and b are finite, whereas A is infinite, they are evidently not identical).

[superhormone]

why not both?

[vkut79]

A is semantically equivalent to its semantic content i.e. the set of every logical consequence of A. In other words P and ~(~P), read as 'it is false that A is false', are alternative methods of expressing the same theory. Therefore, the semantic content of A is infinite, since even the empty set of premises entails infinitely many tautologies.

Are you assuming to begin with that the set of all possible semantic content is infinite?

[nocturne]

You say that A is infinite and a and b are finite. Could you explain why? I don't see how A, a theory consisting of a set logical outcomes, is infinite. Or at least how a clearly defined theory would be infinite.Every set of premises, even the empty set, has infinitely many implications. In fact, uncountably many implications. Theories are identified not by any particular statements, but by their semantic content i.e. implications and logical relationship to other statements and theories. For example, the following expresses a semantic equivalence between two formulae,

P → Q =||= ~(P & ~Q)

Likewise, the two following sets of formulae are semantically equivalent,

P → Q, P =||= P, Q

They are semantically equivalent because they entail each other, and therefore neither has any logical implications which are not shared by the other. The 'semantic content' for some set of statements X, is the set of every logical consequence of X, which I will represent by the notation C(X). Therefore, for any set of formulae A and any set of formulae B, which may or may not be identical,

1. If A |= B then C(B) ⊂ C(A)
2. If A ≠||= B then C(B) ⊆ C(A)
3. If A =||= B then C(B) = C(A)

Number 3 expresses the point that if A and B are mutually interdeducible, then there is no member of the semantic content of A which is not a member of B, and vice versa. In other words, if A and B are mutually interdeducible, then A and B are the same theory, even though A and B may be different expressions of the same theory, for example,

If A = P → Q and B = ~(P & ~Q) then A ≠ B

However, the following equivalence does work,

If A = C(P → Q) and B = C(~(P & ~Q)) then A = B

In any case, since the set {} is a member of every set, and there are infinitely many tautologies i.e. formulae which are implied by the empty set (where there is no consistent interpretation which assigns them the truth-value 'false'), then it is trivially the case that C(A), for any A whatsoever, even if A is empty, is an infinite set.

Edit: To be more concise and less off-topic. If A is a well-formed formulae and B is a well-formed formula, then 'A & B' is a well-formed formula. This process is recurisve, so if 'A & B' is a well-formed formula and C is a well-formed formula, then '(A & B) & C' is a well-formed formula (whether A, B and C are identical or not). The function can be applied indefinitely, yielding infinitely many well-formed formulae.

[vkut79]

Your analysis is definitely beyond my level of understanding. Thanks for explaining it though.

That aside, I can see that "ideas exist". They are clearly a part of our reality. Given that, it doesn't make sense to me to say that ideas exist outside of thinking minds. And thinking minds are simply active physical brains. So if there are no active physical brains, it seems to make sense to say that ideas don't exist. Similarly, does it make sense to say that matter exists outside of thinking minds? If there are no active physical brains/thinking minds, then perhaps matter as we know it also doesn't exist. Without our minds there is neither, because all is perception, contingent on brain/mind activity.

As to answering the posed question, regarding dualism vs. materialism, I think it's just a matter of perspective. There may be more than one way (two ways) of interpreting the phenomenon of consciousness, but the two do not necessarily need to be at odds, I think. They describe the same experience - perception + consciousness - via different perspectives.

[Ool]

Ok guys, time I think for something a little different (the whole god thing is getting a bit stale). What are our views on consciousness and the mind? Is a sensation identical to a brain process which is identical to the firing of neutrons inside our brain. Or is there something within us that is actually doing the sensing? I suppose this leads to questions about the existence of the soul and such... I think if we can come up with a solid theory for materialism it should be accepted before dualism as it would be inately more simple. Thoughts?

Actually you don’t know whether matter exists at all. You know that you exist and you know that the patterns you perceive exist.

So you can be sure about the existence of your soul, but you can’t be positive whether it’s really in your brain.

Materialists and dualists both take the existence of something for granted that a dyed-in-the-wool solipsist never would.

Amateurs…!

[Marcus Brutus]

Yeh sorry nocturne, your logical is to immense for my poor humble comprehension. When i have a spare hour i will actually put an effort into trying to get it though. But thanks for a rather complete, if technical, explanation.





Marcus Brutus added to this post, 0 minutes and 59 seconds later...

Actually you don’t know whether matter exists at all. You know that you exist and you know that the patterns you perceive exist.

So you can be sure about the existence of your soul, but you can’t be positive whether it’s really in your brain.

Materialists and dualists both take the existence of something for granted that a dyed-in-the-wool solipsist never would.

Amateurs…!

... define "soul"

[Ool]

... define "soul"

“Consciousness.”

Same thing, less unwieldy word…





Ool added to this post, 8 minutes and 51 seconds later...

Yeh sorry nocturne, your logical is to immense for my poor humble comprehension.

Looks like it makes a clear distinction between intensional and extensional equality. Just because something has the same result doesn’t mean it’s the same thing. Also a lot of propositions have a result of nothing, i.e. the empty set. You can build infinitely many of them. If you could build infinitely large ones you could build uncountably infinitely many.

[Marcus Brutus]

“Consciousness.”

Same thing, less unwieldy word…

Certainly, so we can be sure consciousness exists but we cannot be certain its in the brain. I agree. However, the simpliest explanation of consciousness that is consistent with our knowledge of biology and science in general, is that it is identical to a brain process. Otherwise consciousness would be a "ghoststuff"; it would exist in some way our science is yet unable to comprehend - our science would need be more complicated. So, as an application of Occam's Razor, we should accept the theory that consciousness is a brain process before we accept it is anything else, unless of course such a theory is impossible without logical inconsistency.

[The Many]

Ok guys, time I think for something a little different (the whole god thing is getting a bit stale). What are our views on consciousness and the mind? Is a sensation identical to a brain process which is identical to the firing of neutrons inside our brain. Or is there something within us that is actually doing the sensing? I suppose this leads to questions about the existence of the soul and such... I think if we can come up with a solid theory for materialism it should be accepted before dualism as it would be inately more simple. Thoughts?

Taking into consideration the experience of qualia, as is different from mere physical processes, it seems to me as though that the mind must be accounted for in a dualistic manner (and yes, this is assuming the existence of matter and of the perceived reality, but that is quite beside the point at the moment). This is not, however, to imply that qualia are created in the soul as Descartes or Berkeley argued, as the soul (in a religious sense) seems to me quite unlikely to exist. I agree with you in that the soul ought to be dismissed based upon the principle of Occam's Razor, and also for purely scientific reasons, as it is a theory that simply cannot be falsified.

Instead, qualia is the way through which we experience the percieved reality, based on materialistic processes*; even though these very processes have not been discovered as of yet. However, given the development of the natural sciences, it seems likely that we will be able to find such an explanation upon further experimentation.

*This does not, however, imply outright epiphenomenalism and determinism, but rather a quite functonalistic and compatibilistic view of free will. Even considering Libet's experiment (and assuming that his methodology was correct, which is somewhat doubtable), we are able to consciously direct our thoughts; yet, these thoughts are all bound by our experiences and the deductions we have, consciously and sub-consciously, made out of to these experiences. Essentially, the mind is able to consider many alternatives when facing all situations, and we are then able to decide what we see to be the best course of actions. These alternatives that we consider, and indeed, our memories, are also most likely based on materialistic processes which we have yet to fully understand.

[Marcus Brutus]

Instead, qualia is the way through which we experience the percieved reality, based on materialistic processes*; even though these very processes have not been discovered as of yet. However, given the development of the natural sciences, it seems likely that we will be able to find such an explanation upon further experimentation.

The existence of qualia does make intuitive sense, however I find it hard to come to grips with a logical argument that necessitates their existence. I suppose if you could make an android, that in every way mimiced a human - its artificial brain was an electronic replica of the same brain processes a human has - would this being experience qualia? Where would these qualias be? And if he didn't, what would make his experiences any different from ours?

Futhermore, if natural science would be able to explain qualia, then wouldn't qualia be a physical phenomenum? If this were the case, then it should be compatible with materialism?

[The Many]

The existence of qualia does make intuitive sense, however I find it hard to come to grips with a logical argument that necessitates their existence. I suppose if you could make an android, that in every way mimiced a human - its artificial brain was an electronic replica of the same brain processes a human has - would this being experience qualia? Where would these qualias be? And if he didn't, what would make his experiences any different from ours?

Futhermore, if natural science would be able to explain qualia, then wouldn't qualia be a physical phenomenum? If this were the case, then it should be compatible with materialism?

First, I should really mention that I appreciate you posting this thread. I enjoy deep discussion, and religion gets tiring as there is only so much to be said about it; and frankly, it has all been said already. So cheers for posting this.

Then as to this post... as to qualia, they can only be subjectively percieved. I cannot know if you, as a human being (I presume :p), percieve any kind of qualia. I would go so far as to state there is no real logical argument in favour of their existence, but only an empirical one; and an empirical one that is (as of now) subjectively percieved as well, making the issue somewhat hard to discuss. As to the robot; we simply cannot know, at least when using the instruments that we have at our disposal today - I would assume, however, that it would experience some kind of qualia, but it would be as unknowable to us as the qualia of any other person. Now, what would be interesting would be some kind of machine that made us able to project qualia so that everyone could see them.

As to qualia being natural phenomena, they could hypothetically be narrowed down to being physical phenomena, yes. However, due to their abstract nature, qualia are more likely to be produced by material causes; whilst not being material themselves. I think they are compatible with materialism even as of now; being, at least most likely, produced through physical processes but experienced in another way.

[Marcus Brutus]

First, I should really mention that I appreciate you posting this thread. I enjoy deep discussion, and religion gets tiring as there is only so much to be said about it; and frankly, it has all been said already. So cheers for posting this.
No problems! And yeh, after a while that religion debate devolves into little more then hitting each others heads in with rubber chickens.

Then as to this post... as to qualia, they can only be subjectively percieved. I cannot know if you, as a human being (I presume :p), percieve any kind of qualia. I would go so far as to state there is no real logical argument in favour of their existence, but only an empirical one; and an empirical one that is (as of now) subjectively percieved as well, making the issue somewhat hard to discuss. As to the robot; we simply cannot know, at least when using the instruments that we have at our disposal today - I would assume, however, that it would experience some kind of qualia, but it would be as unknowable to us as the qualia of any other person. Now, what would be interesting would be some kind of machine that made us able to project qualia so that everyone could see them.
Ok, interesting. I wonder though if my calculator experiences qualia. Or if my ipod experiences equalia. Or if my computer experiences qualia. Or if a neural network that works out fluid dynamics or something experiences qualia. The point I'm getting at here, is whether there is a certain level of intelligence where qualia is experienced, but below this level no such experience happens. And how do we go about ascertaining this level without it being completely arbritary?


As to qualia being natural phenomena, they could hypothetically be narrowed down to being physical phenomena, yes. However, due to their abstract nature, qualia are more likely to be produced by material causes; whilst not being material themselves. I think they are compatible with materialism even as of now; being, at least most likely, produced through physical processes but experienced in another way.
So when we say "experienced in another way", does that imply something supernatural (as opposed to natural) about the experience? Sorry for asking all these questions and not really making arguments myself; but i guess it is the job of the materialist to question the nature of qualia to see if such a premise is logically consistent; to see whether qualia, as it seems to be empirically, is actually representitive of our sensations.


To Nocturne: Ok so any conceivable idea has infinite semantic content. That seems to be your major point. So there are countless ways to refer to a proposition. Certainly. But what about a proposition that has not been thought of yet? I guess my point is are you trying to say that every conceivable proposition exists. I would though suggest that a non-physical idea (say a pink unicorn), at least, is just the sum of all the semantic references that relate to a pink unicorn. Now this is, as you put it, an infinite number. And i suppose when it comes to classifying infinites i tend to get myself confused... Maybe Ool could help, he seems to have the concept of infinity well within his grips (INTPs really do seem to have a superior logic). However could it not just be X = (a,b,c....∞) where a, b and c refer to X's semantic content?





Marcus Brutus added to this post, 29 minutes and 32 seconds later...

Ok my Ni just kicked in...

Could we maybe put it this way; at a given moment proposition X can be expressed as X = (a,b,c...etc) where a, b and c are semantic references of X. However, at any given moment the number of semantic references will be limited to the number of references actually realised. It is the sum of all the semantic references that exist in all people's memories somewhere and perhaps even the semantic references written down on paper about it. But taken in a single instant, X need not also consist of the unrealised semantic references to it. So it has, in any given instant, a finite meaning.

[The Many]

No problems! And yeh, after a while that religion debate devolves into little more then hitting each others heads in with rubber chickens.

Ok, interesting. I wonder though if my calculator experiences qualia. Or if my ipod experiences equalia. Or if my computer experiences qualia. Or if a neural network that works out fluid dynamics or something experiences qualia. The point I'm getting at here, is whether there is a certain level of intelligence where qualia is experienced, but below this level no such experience happens. And how do we go about ascertaining this level without it being completely arbritary?

So when we say "experienced in another way", does that imply something supernatural (as opposed to natural) about the experience? Sorry for asking all these questions and not really making arguments myself; but i guess it is the job of the materialist to question the nature of qualia to see if such a premise is logically consistent; to see whether qualia, as it seems to be empirically, is actually representitive of our sensations.

As to the calculator or the iPod, we cannot know. But then again, assigning qualia to everything is an unfalsifiable hypotheses in the same manner as stating the existence of souls, which makes the argument somewhat uninteresting - and also unscientific. It is not really interesting to know where qualia begins or end; only that it exists in our experience.

As to the latter, I would say it is a question of abstract, rather than concrete experience, but still natural and not super-natural experience. Then if qualia are representative of our sensations or not is another thing; qualia really constitute the sensations as we experience them, not the other way around. The question is rather if our categorizations; that is, our intellectualized representations of the qualia are correct or not. And please, do not be afraid of asking anything... If anything, the Socratic method is another way of arguing.

[Marcus Brutus]

As to the calculator or the iPod, we cannot know. But then again, assigning qualia to everything is an unfalsifiable hypotheses in the same manner as stating the existence of souls, which makes the argument somewhat uninteresting - and also unscientific. It is not really interesting to know where qualia begins or end; only that it exists in our experience.
But if qualia does exist, is it not interesting to define what it is? That's my point with qualia, certainly an abaques does not experience it. And one of those old analogue computers that used cards with wholes in them? Certainly not. I guess we are moving to the question of what defines intelligence. For if qualia is real, then it seems that an intelligent being experiences qualia. And my problem with intelligence is if you can create a scale from an inanimate rock to a intelligent human the observable physical differences within the different "things" are reducible down to (if you go to a subatomic level) near insignificance. Scientifically, is intelligence just a way of classifying a certain interaction between (sub)atomic particles and electrical charges?


As to the latter, I would say it is a question of abstract, rather than concrete experience, but still natural and not super-natural experience. Then if qualia are representative of our sensations or not is another thing; qualia really constitute the sensations as we experience them, not the other way around. The question is rather if our categorizations; that is, our intellectualized representations of the qualia are correct or not. And please, do not be afraid of asking anything... If anything, the Socratic method is another way of arguing.
Here i get confused: an abstract, non-concrete experience which is natural (and thereby implicitly physical) in property? Certainly this is paradoxical. You say qualia constitute our sensations as we experience them; I would contend that "experience of our sensations" is akin to saying "experience of our experiences". Our experiences and our sensations are one in the same; they are identical. When i look at a light i experience a yellow/white sense-datum. "Experiencing the yellow/white sense-datum" is identical to "seeing the light". Hence the whole talk about qualia is, i think, an unnecessary complication.

[nocturne]

Marcus Brutus,

The 'content' of a proposition is not simply the set of every semantically equivalent proposition, but also includes every other proposition which can be deduced, even where semantic equivalence does not hold. For example,

P |= P v Q
P v Q |≠ P

That is, P entails P v Q but P v Q does not entail P. Therefore,

P v Q ∈ C(P)
P ∉ C(P v Q)

That is, P v Q is a member of the content of P, but P is not a member of the content of P v Q.

In other words, P v Q is a member of the content of P, or a semantic consequence if you prefer, but P v Q is not semantically equivalent to P. Therefore, while P is semantically equivalent to C(P), there are members for C(P) which are not semantically equivalent to P.

This is simply to say that we are dealing here with deduction, rather than equivalence--while every equivalence is a deduction, not every deduction is an equivalence. If t is a theory, then t is identified (i.e. is identical to) its semantic content, whose members are comprised of every theory which is semantically equivalent to t, and every theory, proposition, or whatever, which is a semantic consequence of t. It is important to understand that when we analyse or investigate t, we are not only exploring the set of semantically equivalent statements, but also the semantic consequences where semantic equivalence may not hold.

The brain, which is finite, cannot represent infinitely, uncountably, many semantic consequences, and yet nobody would claim that these semantic consequences only exist when they are represented by a brain. For example, imagine that t is contradictory, but for some person, or until some particular time, the contradictory semantic consequence of t had not been represented in the brain: would it make any sense to say that t is contradictory for some people and not for others? or that before the contradiction was thought about t was not contradictory? (There is, as an aside, only one contradictory theory).

There would be no need for such painstaking and difficult procedures as the analysis or investigation of a theory, if it were the case that our brain could capture and represent the entire theory. The fact that interesting, or problematic, consequences of a theory can remain hidden from us, despite the fact that we may have invented the theory in question, suggests to me that we are exploring something which is far bigger than the brain which we are exploring it with.

Finally. Of course, it may be said that some neural substrate may represent, or refer to some theory, just as the string of symbols 'P & Q' may be used to represent, or refer to the content of 'P & Q', or C(P & Q). However, it would be a mistake to say that the string of symbols 'P & Q' is identical to C(P & Q). This is equivalent to mistaking a word for its meaning; in this case, you would be mistaking a combination of neurons (instead of a string of symbols) for its meaning, which though referenced by that combination of neurons, is not identical to them.

[Ool]

The existence of qualia does make intuitive sense, however I find it hard to come to grips with a logical argument that necessitates their existence.

That’s because you can’t. Qualia exist before logic. The order of first principles is this:


I exist.
My perceptions exist. (Those would be the qualia.)
There is cause and effect between my perceptions and between my perceptions and myself. (This is the point where logic begins, concerning itself with the particulars of these assumed causal relations, not sooner.)


I suppose if you could make an android, that in every way mimiced a human - its artificial brain was an electronic replica of the same brain processes a human has - would this being experience qualia? Where would these qualias be? And if he didn't, what would make his experiences any different from ours?

You don’t need an android for that question. You can’t even tell whether I see color the same way as you or smell smells like you do. The only qualia you can ever be sure of are your own, and that will never ever change.

Futhermore, if natural science would be able to explain qualia, then wouldn't qualia be a physical phenomenum? If this were the case, then it should be compatible with materialism?

“Phenomenon.” Actually you might want to use the plural “phenomena,” since “qualia” is also the plural of “quale…”

Natural science won’t ever be able to explain qualia because natural science is based on the existence of perceptions and on the idea of cause and effect. All it does is test out theoretical relations between observations. It doesn’t question or explain the observations in any other fashion than in relation to other observations.

[The Many]

But if qualia does exist, is it not interesting to define what it is? That's my point with qualia, certainly an abaques does not experience it. And one of those old analogue computers that used cards with wholes in them? Certainly not. I guess we are moving to the question of what defines intelligence. For if qualia is real, then it seems that an intelligent being experiences qualia. And my problem with intelligence is if you can create a scale from an inanimate rock to a intelligent human the observable physical differences within the different "things" are reducible down to (if you go to a subatomic level) near insignificance. Scientifically, is intelligence just a way of classifying a certain interaction between (sub)atomic particles and electrical charges?

How do you know the computers did not experience them? And there is nothing to say that an intelligent being as such necessarily percieves qualia. Neither can I (as of now) see any direct correlation between qualia and intelligence; the only thing we know is the empirical fact that qualia are percieved.

Here i get confused: an abstract, non-concrete experience which is natural (and thereby implicitly physical) in property? Certainly this is paradoxical. You say qualia constitute our sensations as we experience them; I would contend that "experience of our sensations" is akin to saying "experience of our experiences". Our experiences and our sensations are one in the same; they are identical. When i look at a light i experience a yellow/white sense-datum. "Experiencing the yellow/white sense-datum" is identical to "seeing the light". Hence the whole talk about qualia is, i think, an unnecessary complication.

There is nothing to say that something 'natural' is implicitly physical. For example, light has no mass, but I would still dare as much as to assert that it is created through physical phenomena. Hence, I cannot find anything paradoxical in the statement; for what is 'natural' does not necessarily have a mass as you seem to imply. Also, unfortunately, we cannot really know if there is a direct correlation between our actual sensations (i.e. the physical reactions in our bodies) and our mental experiences or feelings; in fact, recent research from, for example, Stephen Stich, points in another way - the 'folk psychology' through which we describe qualia (i.e. our emotions or perceptions various things) is not necessarily what is actually happening.

Thus, qualia, being our perceptions of sensations and not the actual sensations themselves, seem to be quite different from the sensations; and need to be accounted for as such. However, as I have mentioned, I do believe that qualia are explainable through physical phenomena, but that we simply have not understood these phenomena as of yet.

[Ool]

Actually light has mass. It’s proportional to its energy.

E=mc², remember?

Light has no rest mass, but then, light is never at rest…

[Marcus Brutus]

There is nothing to say that something 'natural' is implicitly physical. For example, light has no mass, but I would still dare as much as to assert that it is created through physical phenomena. Hence, I cannot find anything paradoxical in the statement; for what is 'natural' does not necessarily have a mass as you seem to imply.

As Ool has pointed out in regards to light, i would suggest that everything we observe in nature has measurable physical qualities. Qualia however do not. They are, if you will, nomological danglers; they hang outside all current theories of physics. Perhaps physics is not enough to explain the universe... but I would contend that a string theory should be, theoritically, possible if a complete knowledge of physical systems is aquired. So i would suggest that ultimately, everything that exists is physical.


Also, unfortunately, we cannot really know if there is a direct correlation between our actual sensations (i.e. the physical reactions in our bodies) and our mental experiences or feelings; in fact, recent research from, for example, Stephen Stich, points in another way - the 'folk psychology' through which we describe qualia (i.e. our emotions or perceptions various things) is not necessarily what is actually happening.
Thus, qualia, being our perceptions of sensations and not the actual sensations themselves, seem to be quite different from the sensations; and need to be accounted for as such. However, as I have mentioned, I do believe that qualia are explainable through physical phenomena, but that we simply have not understood these phenomena as of yet.

I think you are jumping to a certain assumption, being, that we perceive our sensations. I'll quote you here the philosopher J. J. C. Smart:
Suppose that I report that I have at this moment a roundish, blurry-edged afterimage which is yellowish towards its edge and is orange towards its centre. What is it that I am reporting? One answer to this question might be that I am not reporting anything, that when I say that it looks to me as though there is a roundish yellowy-orange patch of light on the wall I am expressing some sort of temptation, the temptation to say that there is a roundish yellowy-orange patch on the wall. This is perhaps Wittgenstein's view in the Philosophical Investigations. Similarly, when I 'report' a pain, I am not really reporting anything (or, if you like, I am reporting in a queer sense of 'reporting), but am doing a sophisticated sort of wince.
- Sensations and brain processes
Tell me why I should think that I perceive my sensations as opposed to react to my sensations; A sense-datum occurs (being certain neurons firing in my brain) and there is a reaction to this sense-datum (being other neurons firing in my brain)

[The Many]

As Ool has pointed out in regards to light, i would suggest that everything we observe in nature has measurable physical qualities. Qualia however do not. They are, if you will, nomological danglers; they hang outside all current theories of physics. Perhaps physics is not enough to explain the universe... but I would contend that a string theory should be, theoritically, possible if a complete knowledge of physical systems is aquired. So i would suggest that ultimately, everything that exists is physical.

I think you are jumping to a certain assumption, being, that we perceive our sensations. I'll quote you here the philosopher J. J. C. Smart:

Tell me why I should think that I perceive my sensations as opposed to react to my sensations; A sense-datum occurs (being certain neurons firing in my brain) and there is a reaction to this sense-datum (being other neurons firing in my brain)

My bad on the light mass thing there... I really should read more physics; they were never a field where I was much involved, and that was a pretty basic thing to miss as I actually have read that earlier on.

However, this does not really change anything from the rest of my propositions - it is very possible for a phenomenon to be natural without being physical; at least, there is nothing contradictory in this statement, given that qualia certainly do exist, or that a God etcetera may exist, even though I do not believe so. However, there is, as we have also seen earlier in this thread, nothing to say that qualia could not be reduced to physical substances or that they could not be accounted for in some kind of physical system, even though we have not understood that physical system as of now. That was basically my original argument; that we (probably) will be able to understand how qualia are created, even though we do not percieve them as being physical as such.

As to the quote by Smart; you do feel pain, don't you? If you do, then you are percieving qualia. However, there is nothing to say that the qualia you are percieving are necessarily similar to the reaction in your body (for certainly, your body does react to sensations, I was not denying that), or at least, that your understanding of the qualia are similar to the reactions in your body. You are percieving these reactions as qualia; yet there is nothing to say that these qualia is necessarily interpreted as what is actually happening in your body, which is basically what I was pointing at earlier. Hence, you both react to your sensations and perceive them, but the perception may not be the same as the reaction (even though, admittedly, the perception may be similar to an as of yet not discovered reaction).

[Marcus Brutus]

My bad on the light mass thing there... I really should read more physics; they were never a field where I was much involved, and that was a pretty basic thing to miss as I actually have read that earlier on.

However, this does not really change anything from the rest of my propositions - it is very possible for a phenomenon to be natural without being physical; at least, there is nothing contradictory in this statement, given that qualia certainly do exist, or that a God etcetera may exist, even though I do not believe so. However, there is, as we have also seen earlier in this thread, nothing to say that qualia could not be reduced to physical substances or that they could not be accounted for in some kind of physical system, even though we have not understood that physical system as of now. That was basically my original argument; that we (probably) will be able to understand how qualia are created, even though we do not percieve them as being physical as such.
You see, i have to disagree here - i have no reason to accept that a phenomeonon can be natural without being physical, as I am suggesting that qualia do not infact exist. Or, at least, what we call qualia is identical to the observably physical actions that go on in our head. Again your whole argument is assuming that qualia is something different to a physical brain process without really giving a reason as to why.

As to the quote by Smart; you do feel pain, don't you? If you do, then you are percieving qualia. However, there is nothing to say that the qualia you are percieving are necessarily similar to the reaction in your body (for certainly, your body does react to sensations, I was not denying that), or at least, that your understanding of the qualia are similar to the reactions in your body. You are percieving these reactions as qualia; yet there is nothing to say that these qualia is necessarily interpreted as what is actually happening in your body, which is basically what I was pointing at earlier. Hence, you both react to your sensations and perceive them, but the perception may not be the same as the reaction (even though, admittedly, the perception may be similar to an as of yet not discovered reaction).
Well i suppose this is your argument as to why qualia exist - it is an argument from the seemingly obvious. However, Smart would contend you are getting mixed up. He would suggest that no, we do not feel pain, at least, not in the sense that something external of the brain process perceives the said brain process. The experience of pain would be no more than this: nerve receptors are activated (say the heat receptors when you touch something hot), they send a signal to the area of your brain that is concerned with interpreting such signals, neurons in the brain fire because of this input of data and send a signal to perhaps the rationalising part of your brain that interprets this input as being the object is hot. Actually, its probably much more complicated then that and I do not understand neuroscience to the degree to explain the exact physiology; however the physiological reaction is all that the feeling consists of. And i think a good reason to believe this is our complete inability to describe the "feeling" of a sensation. If i was to ask you what a pain feels like, you may describe it as a dull ache, a sharp stab or something of that like, however these descriptions are terribly imperfect. If i was to ask you what the blue of the sky looked like you might describe it as a light but bright colour; again a rather imperfect explanation. These supposed qualia are indescribeable, to the best of our knowledge non-physical and ultimately i think is identical to an observable physiological reaction.

Ok heres another way to think about it. When i report "I am in pain", i am not necessarily just reporting that I am having the brain process X. The thing though that I am reporting is identical to the brain process X. In so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain-process.

[The Many]

You see, i have to disagree here - i have no reason to accept that a phenomeonon can be natural without being physical, as I am suggesting that qualia do not infact exist. Or, at least, what we call qualia is identical to the observably physical actions that go on in our head. Again your whole argument is assuming that qualia is something different to a physical brain process without really giving a reason as to why.


Well i suppose this is your argument as to why qualia exist - it is an argument from the seemingly obvious. However, Smart would contend you are getting mixed up. He would suggest that no, we do not feel pain, at least, not in the sense that something external of the brain process perceives the said brain process. The experience of pain would be no more than this: nerve receptors are activated (say the heat receptors when you touch something hot), they send a signal to the area of your brain that is concerned with interpreting such signals, neurons in the brain fire because of this input of data and send a signal to perhaps the rationalising part of your brain that interprets this input as being the object is hot. Actually, its probably much more complicated then that and I do not understand neuroscience to the degree to explain the exact physiology; however the physiological reaction is all that the feeling consists of. And i think a good reason to believe this is our complete inability to describe the "feeling" of a sensation. If i was to ask you what a pain feels like, you may describe it as a dull ache, a sharp stab or something of that like, however these descriptions are terribly imperfect. If i was to ask you what the blue of the sky looked like you might describe it as a light but bright colour; again a rather imperfect explanation. These supposed qualia are indescribeable, to the best of our knowledge non-physical and ultimately i think is identical to an observable physiological reaction.

Ok heres another way to think about it. When i report "I am in pain", i am not necessarily just reporting that I am having the brain process X. The thing though that I am reporting is identical to the brain process X. In so far as a sensation statement is a report of something, that something is in fact a brain-process.

I am not going to bother countering all the arguments put forward here, as I believe I have already done so. However, if you want some big names who would agree with me, you could look at David Chalmers and Saul Kripke. They have observed that we may experience qualia which cannot actually be traced to the kind of physiological reaction that you are pointing at, which is what I have tried to assert here.

[Marcus Brutus]

I am not going to bother countering all the arguments put forward here, as I believe I have already done so. However, if you want some big names who would agree with me, you could look at David Chalmers and Saul Kripke. They have observed that we may experience qualia which cannot actually be traced to the kind of physiological reaction that you are pointing at, which is what I have tried to assert here.

I suppose that's my problem here; you do not really seem to be responding to my points but instead asserting your alternative (that qualia are different to brain processes and may have some physical property we are yet to find out). But I do tend to feel that my arguments go somewhat unaddressed. It is good you bring up Kripke though, he does actually attempt to directly challenge Smart's view in the following way (as simply as i can put such a complicated argument anyway):

1. For Smart to be right, he needs to adopt a descriptionist view of language where a "contingent identity" (like say "the morning star is the evening star") can have a true/false value. The best expressed descriptionist view of language is probably that purported by Russell.
2. Russell's theory of language is wrong about names.
3. We can "name" our conscious experiences.
4. Thus, our conscious experiences are not identical to brain processes.

At least, thats how i read Kripke... I'm not sure his argument against Russell is solid though (there is the Lumpil/Goalith response). If you want to continue this discusion I think we have to get into theories about language though.

[The Many]

I suppose that's my problem here; you do not really seem to be responding to my points but instead asserting your alternative (that qualia are different to brain processes and may have some physical property we are yet to find out). But I do tend to feel that my arguments go somewhat unaddressed. It is good you bring up Kripke though, he does actually attempt to directly challenge Smart's view in the following way (as simply as i can put such a complicated argument anyway):

1. For Smart to be right, he needs to adopt a descriptionist view of language where a "contingent identity" (like say "the morning star is the evening star") can have a true/false value. The best expressed descriptionist view of language is probably that purported by Russell.
2. Russell's theory of language is wrong about names.
3. We can "name" our conscious experiences.
4. Thus, our conscious experiences are not identical to brain processes.

At least, thats how i read Kripke... I'm not sure his argument against Russell is solid though (there is the Lumpil/Goalith response). If you want to continue this discusion I think we have to get into theories about language though.

The problem with your arguments is that they could be true, but also - perhaps - are not. We do not presently know, so it is quite hard to fully answer. As to philosophy of language, I am afraid it is a field I have not researched to a very great extent, or at least not to an extent that makes me comfortable in discussing it (it is a very complicated field and I am a lot more interested in continental philosophy than (analytic) Anglo-American philosophy; my own theorization is a bit of a merge between the two, even though I am much more knowledgeable about continental philosophy). However, I am largely in agreement with Kripke when it comes to the descriptionist/casual theories of language, which makes me able to accept his views regarding qualia.